¿Deuda Pública Insostenible en una Unión Fiscal Europea? by Kutasi, Gábor
25
Gábor Kutasi*
Recibido: 3 de diciembre de 2015
Concepto de evaluación: 29 de junio de 2016
Aprobado: 20 de octubre de 2016
* PhD of Economics, Associate 
Professor at Corvinus University 
of Budapest, Hungary. Research 
fellow at Századvég Economic 
Research Co., and recipient 
of the Bolyai Scholarship 
of the Hungarian Academy 
of Science and the KAAD 
Osteuropaprogramm. Address: 
Fovám Tér 8. (C.161) 1993, 
Budapest, Hungary. E-mail: 
gabor.kutasi@uni-corvinus.hu
Finanz. polit. econ., ISSN: 2248-6046, Vol. 9, No. 1, enero-junio, 2017, pp. 25-39 
http://dx.doi.org/10.14718/revfinanzpolitecon.2017.9.1.2
Unsustainable Public Debt  
in a European Fiscal Union?
ABSTRACT 
Some EU members faced years of crisis in the first half of the 2010s 
with an excessive initial public debt, but several others had broad room for 
fiscal stimulus. However, the prolonged duration of the European economic 
depression expended public budgets, while exhausting stimulus policies and 
sovereign solvency. Meanwhile, one of the ways out of depression is a proposed 
centralization of the EU through fiscal union. Are the eurozone countries ready 
to participate in a risk pool in public finances? The study seeks to answer this 
question. The article presents the hypothesis that the sustainability of public 
finances deteriorated during the global and euro crisis in the majority of the 
eurozone member countries and in the EU, and this phenomenon is discou-
raging the core countries from seeking the fiscal union. The analysis uses the 
Blanchard indicators of fiscal sustainability and the sovereign risk rating of 
the EURO-18 and EU-28 countries. The analysis presents as results a theore-
tical summary of fiscal sustainability, the development of fiscal sustainability 
in the EU member states, indicators of convergence or divergence of fiscal 
sustainability in the Community, and conclusions based on the indicators of 
the likelihood of a fiscal union.
Keyworlds: fiscal sustainability, euro zone.
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¿Deuda	pública	insostenible	en	una	unión	fiscal	europea?	
RESUMEN
Algunos miembros de la UE enfrentaron años de crisis en la primera 
mitad de la década de 2010 con una excesiva deuda pública inicial, pero varios 
otros tenían amplio margen para estímulos fiscales. Sin embargo, la prolongada 
duración de la depresión económica europea agotó los presupuestos públicos, 
debilitando las políticas de estímulo y la solvencia soberana. Mientras tanto, 
una de las formas de salir de la depresión es una centralización propuesta de 
la UE mediante una unión fiscal. ¿Están los países de la eurozona dispuestos a 
participar en un fondo de riesgo en las finanzas públicas? El estudio busca res-
ponder a esta pregunta. El artículo presenta la hipótesis de que la sostenibilidad 
de las finanzas públicas se deterioró durante la crisis global y la crisis del euro en 
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la mayoría de los países miembros de la eurozona y en la UE, lo cual desalienta 
a los países centrales de buscar la unión fiscal. El análisis utiliza los indicadores 
de sostenibilidad fiscal de Blanchard y la calificación de riesgo soberano de los 
países de EURO-18 y UE-28. El análisis presenta como resultados un resumen 
teórico de la sostenibilidad fiscal, el desarrollo de la sostenibilidad fiscal en los 
Estados miembros de la UE, los indicadores de convergencia o divergencia de 
sostenibilidad fiscal en la Comunidad y conclusiones basadas en los indicadores 
de la probabilidad de una unión fiscal.
Palabras clave: sostenibilidad fiscal, eurozona.
Dívida	pública	insustentável	numa	união	fiscal	europeia?
RESUMO
Alguns membros da União Europeia (EU) enfrentaram anos de crise na 
primeira metade da década de 2010 com uma excessiva dívida pública inicial, 
mas vários outros tinham ampla margem para incentivos fiscais. Contudo, a 
prolongada duração da depressão econômica europeia esgotou o orçamentos 
público, o que debilitou as políticas de incentivo e solvência soberana. Enquanto 
isso, uma das formas de sair da depressão é uma centralização proposta pela 
UE mediante uma união fiscal. Os países da Zona do Euro estão dispostos a 
participar de um fundo de risco nas finanças públicas? Este estudo pretende 
responder a essa pergunta. O artigo apresenta a hipótese de que a sustentabili-
dade das finanças públicas se deteriorou durante a crise global e a crise do euro 
na maioria dos países-membros da Zona do Euro e na UE, o que desencorajou 
os países centrais a buscarem a união fiscal. A análise utiliza os indicadores 
de sustentabilidade fiscal de Blanchard e a qualificação de risco soberano dos 
países da EURO-18 e UE-28. Além disso, apresenta como resultados um resumo 
teórico da sustentabilidade fiscal, do desenvolvimento da sustentabilidade fiscal 
nos Estados-membros da UE, dos indicadores de convergência ou divergência 
de sustentabilidade fiscal na comunidade e conclusões baseadas nos indicadores 
da probabilidade de uma união fiscal.
Palavras-chave: sustentabilidade fiscal, Zona do Euro.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2009, several EU members faced years of crisis 
with an excessive initial public debt, but some 
others had broad room for fiscal stimulus. However, 
the prolonged duration of the European economic 
depression expended public budgets, while ex-
hausting stimulus policies and sovereign solvency. 
Meanwhile, one of the ways out of depression is 
a proposed centralization of the EU through fiscal 
union.
As Benczes (2014: 66) explained regarding 
the fiscal union, this is not a new plan, as the 
idea or necessity of a fiscal union accompanied 
by monetary integration already appeared in the 
MacDougall Report (1977) as well as in the Delors 
Report (1989). Fuest and Peichel (2012) identified 
several elements of the fiscal union.1 The present 
study is related to the risk pool that originated 
in joint guarantees for each other’s public debt 
or even each other’s external debt through fiscal 
transfers and equalization. Are the eurozone cou-
ntries or the whole EU finally ready to participate 
in a risk pool in public finances? The study seeks 
to answer this question.
There is a well-developed and broad lite-
rature about budget constraints, default risks, 
fiscal vulnerability and debt sustainability indexes 
(Mankiw, 1997; Barro, 2008; Fatás et al., 2003; 
Buiter & Grafe, 2002; Zee, 1988; Tobin & Buiter, 
1976; Barnhill & Kopits, 2003; Trehan & Walsh, 
1988; Blanchard, 1990; etc.) The present analysis 
is based on this state-of-the-art. The analysis uses 
the Blanchard indicators of fiscal sustainability and 
the sovereign risk rating of the EURO-19 and EU-28 
countries. The applied fiscal sustainability indicators 
are the primary gap indicator and the tax gap indi-
cator proposed by Blanchard (1990). After calcula-
ting and collecting these values, standard deviation 
and average risk indicators will be used to examine 
discouragement. The analysis presents as results 
a theoretical summary of fiscal sustainability, the 
development of fiscal sustainability of EU member 
1 Rules, crisis mechanism, joint guarantee for public debt, 
fiscal transfers, federal budget, and taxes.
states, indicators of convergence or divergence of 
fiscal sustainability in the Community, and conclu-
sions based on the indicators of the likelihood of 
a fiscal union.  
The paper presents the hypothesis that the 
sustainability of public finances deteriorated du-
ring the global and euro crisis in the majority of 
eurozone member countries and in the EU, and this 
phenomenon is discouraging the core countries 
from a fiscal union.
THEORY OF FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY AND 
EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW
Fiscal spending in years of crisis and depression 
means a counter-cyclical policy. In a neoclassi-
cal model, the sustainability of such spending 
would not be a challenge as it assumes counter-
cyclical behavior in years of economic growth too. 
Nevertheless, since the 1970s, the European fiscal 
practice has been rather pro-cyclical with tempo-
rary adjustments; many national public budgets in 
Europe already had high indebtedness in the eve 
of the crisis in 2008. The concept of fiscal sustai-
nability means that sovereigns’ solvency is ensured 
if current debt equals the net present value of the 
sum of future primary surpluses (Benczes & Kutasi, 
2010: 67). Otherwise, continuous annual deficits 
will enforce adjustment to the structure of the 
public budget.
Namely, the basic form of fiscal sustainability 
is a net present value of revenues, expenditures, 
and the existing debt. However, these budget items 
are affected by economic factors that are (partially 
or completely) out of control of the fiscal policy.
This way, we get the budget constraint, 
which is dependent on the interest rate, growth 
rate, and past deficits. 
(gt – τt) + [(1+rt) / (1+nt)] bt-1 = bt   [1]
where g is the government expenditure in 
ratio to GDP, τ is the tax revenue in ratio to GDP, 
r is the real interest rate, n is the growth ratio of 
GDP, b is the debt ratio to the GDP.
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Thus, according to Fatás et al. (2003), the 
change of debt is
∆b = g – τ - + (r-n)b .    [2]
De Grauwe (2000: 167) extended this budget 
constraint by distinguishing seignorage revenues 
(m) as follows:
∆b = g – τ + (r-n)b – m    [3]
From equations (1), (2) and (3), it can be es-
tablished that the public debt ratio can increase if 
r exceeds n, and/or if the fiscal balance is in deficit 
(g – τ >0), and/or if seignorage income is decreasing. 
Equation (2) makes it obvious that there are factors 
that cannot really be modified by the fiscal policy 
in the short term: real interest rate, growth of GDP, 
inherited public debt from past. Quick adjustments 
can only be implemented through tax revenues 
and expenditures. 
Of course, there are cyclical phenomena in 
the budget that must be taken into account in 
order to understand fiscal solvency. This is why, 
according to Chalk and Hemming (2000) and Buiter 
and Grafe (2002), the determination of fiscal sus-
tainability can be refined based on the following 
criterion: the present value of the initial net public 
debt and the present value of future deficits alto-
gether should not exceed the present value of the 
sum of future fiscal surpluses. McCallum (1984) 
considered it a vulnerable fiscal stance when the 
accumulation of absolute debt value is faster than 
the increase rate in interest rate, but slower than 
the speed of economic growth. Seemingly, it means 
decreasing debt-to-GDP ratio, but the sustainability 
criterion is violated.
The budget constraint was refined by the 
fiscal crowding-out effect (Tobin & Buiter, 1976) 
and by the overlapping generations model (Zee, 
1988). The approach extended with the crowding-
out impact includes the effect of public debt on the 
stock of capital assets. It is calculated that the effect 
of taxation on the income remains disposable for 
the private sector and the effect of public debt on 
capital markets, market rates, and saving propen-
sity. The microeconomic approach of overlapping 
generations involves the dynamics originated in 
the finite horizon of individuals standing behind 
public bond acquisitions. Moreover, an individual 
has variable saving preferences and opportunities 
during his/her own life, which strongly correlates 
with variable incomes at different ages. This way, 
the budget constraint can be derived from the 
individuals’ income optimization, namely from 
their saving propensity, the interest rate elasticity 
of private investments and savings, and the capital 
elasticity of the production output. Thus, besides 
the factors mentioned in equations (1)-(3), higher 
capital-to-GDP ratio and bigger interest rate elas-
ticity result in an extended budget constraint and 
improved fiscal sustainability.
Calculating fiscal sustainability is a simple 
technical, mathematical exercise, but keeping the 
budget constraint is a political game both in an 
inter-temporal and in an international sense. The 
former depends on the current preference of so-
ciety (or politicians) regarding whether to finance 
current expenditures or pass them on to future ge-
nerations by indebting them. The latter is possible 
because of the globally interconnected community 
of states, which includes disciplined countries and 
governments that have net savings.
A budget-constraint-based opportunity to 
measure long-term budget solvency is a sustaina-
bility indicator proposed by Buiter (1985), which 
determines the difference between current budget 
deficit and permanent deficit. The latter is derived 
from the net size of the public sector related to 
GDP. Blanchard’s indicators used in this study are 
based on a very similar approach. 
An alternative index for fiscal sustainability, 
created by Croce and Juan-Ramon (2003), is the 
Index of Fiscal Sustainability (IFS):
IFSt 5 (b 2 l) 5 
1 2 rt2222222
1 1 ntreal
 2 
pst 2 ps*2222222
bt21 2 b*j
  [4]
where pst is the current primary surplus,  ps
*is 
the targeted value of the primary balance, bt-1is the 
rate of inherited public debt, b* is the targeted ratio 
of public debt, rt is the real interest rate, and ntreal is 
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the growth rate of real GDP. This index is not used 
this time. If the absolute value of IFS is lower than 
1, the public debt is sustainable. According to the 
budget constraint,
bt # 
(1 1 rt)2222222
(1 1 nt)
21 
3
 pst11 1 ... 1
 (1 1 rt)2222222
(1 1 nt)
2n
3
 pst1mj  m → `   [5]
There are several studies about the fiscal 
sustainability of European countries, which were 
written before the global financial and European 
debt crisis; similarly, there are numerous works that 
include data from the crisis years. For example, 
Afonso (2000) or Afonso and Rault (2010) perfor-
med stationarity tests for the stock of public debt 
and cointegration tests between public expendi-
tures and public revenues for the euro countries, 
and they found that most of the (fifteen) eurozone 
countries had unsustainable debt according to 
data before 2007. However, they state that the 
overall European fiscal stance was sustainable, 
even though there were many challenges at the 
national level, which is also consistent with Claeys’ 
results (2007) from his test based on the cointe-
gration relation between government revenues, 
expenditures, and interest payments based on data 
before 2002. Nevertheless, the repeated analysis by 
Afonso and Rault (2015), including data from the 
crisis years, does not confirm anymore the overall 
sustainability of EU fiscal policies, but they evidence 
the emergence of unsustainability.
There are future-oriented studies too. For 
example, Cournède and Gonand (2008) recommen-
ded and assessed scenarios regarding how to res-
tore sustainability. Similarly, Checherita-Westphal 
et al. (2012) calculated the optimal debt target for 
long-term solvency. Balassone et al. (2008) focused 
on the long-term challenge of aging population 
for the public revenue and expenditure in the EU, 
and forecasted very long-term future trends in 
fiscal sustainability. This approach of analysis was 
repeated in the European Commission (2012), al-
ready including information from the crisis years.
Borgy at al. (2011) analyzed the risk premium 
in relevance to fiscal sustainability. They establis-
hed that before the crisis year of 2009, there was 
a strong comovement among the risk premia of 
the eurozone countries. However, they also refer 
to Laubach (2011) who found that comovement 
among yield spreads has weakened since 2009. 
Namely, the impact of the euro debt crisis caused 
not only deterioration, but divergence in fiscal sus-
tainability among the members, which is a pheno-
menon that supports fiscal union. They concluded 
that, because of the debt crisis, an explosion in 
the EMU governments’ bond yield spreads beca-
me a threat to national solvency and to financial 
stability in Europe. They also found evidence that 
sharp increase in government debt explains the 
bulk of the increase in spreads, which limits fiscal 
stabilization opportunities. But, more importantly, 
“[t]he increase in spreads was to a large extent 
driven by increases in risk premia, implying that the 
deterioration of the economic and fiscal outlook 
during the crisis led to an endogenous increase in 
the market price of risk, thereby magnifying the 
effects on yield spreads much beyond pure com-
pensation for perceived higher default risk” (Borgy 
et al., 2011: 26).
Beritella and Zhang (2015) analyzed public 
debt sustainability in the EU using a dynamic, 
computable general equilibrium model to identify 
the short-term risk to economy due to fiscal unsus-
tainability, and to prove convergence toward the 
public debt threshold. They calculated the short-
term fiscal risk in the well-known PIIGS group of 
countries; their long-term forecast, however, shows 
no long-term risks, but rather the consolidation of 
public debt because of trends in GDP and taxation. 
Neaime (2015) analyzed the long-run, historical 
sustainability of public finances in some EU coun-
tries using the cointegration test on their present 
value constraint. He concluded that the German 
and French public budgets have always been sustai-
nable, but the Irish, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese 
public finances have drifted apart from fiscal sustai-
nability since the 1990s. Chen (2014) examined the 
sustainability of G-7 and PIIGS countries regarding 
30
Finanz. polit. econ., ISSN 2248-6046, Vol. 9, No. 1, enero-junio, 2017, pp. 25-39
Gábor Kutasi
whether they can be characterized by a unit root 
process with non-linear trend and asymmetric ad-
justment. The four different autoregressive tests 
concluded that most of the G-7 and PIIGS countries 
are “characterized by a unit root process which is 
in violation of fiscal sustainability.”
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Sustainability simply means whether a given pro-
cess, activity or policy could be maintained either 
in a definite or in an indefinite future. When so-
mething is rated as unsustainable, it implies an 
expectation that certain phenomena might halt or 
altogether extinguish mechanisms that have been 
working fine so far. Translated into budget policy, 
this means that if the (primary) budget balance 
records constant deficit, it will increase the port-
folio of public debt. And due to an increasing debt 
ratio, government bonds representing this debt will 
become riskier in terms of redemption and interest 
payment. Therefore, the sustainability of budget 
policy is primarily subject to real interest rates and 
economic growth. Fiscal sustainability can be mea-
sured with the indicators proposed by Blanchard 
(1990), namely the primary gap indicator and the 
tax gap indicator.2 These indicators were used in 
this research to measure the fiscal sustainability of 
EU8+2 countries before the global crisis.
The Blanchard indicators are composed as 
follows. The primary gap indicator is rooted in 
the sustainability indicator suggested by Buiter 
(1985), which was deducted as the difference of 
permanent (structural) deficit (d) and the current 
primary deficit (dt), and scaled to the net size of 
public finances to GDP—the primary gap indicator 
replaced the size of public finances to public debt.
The permanent deficit term proposed by 
Blanchard (1990) is
d̑ = ( nt – rt)*bt ,     [6]
and the difference is the primary gap, namely 
d̑ – dt = ( nt – rt)*bt – dt ,     [7]
2 Blanchard has a third indicator too, the so-called long-term 
tax gap (or tax rate stabilizing debt).
where d̑ is the permanent deficit and dt is the 
current deficit. If current deficit exceeds permanent 
deficit (d̑ < dt), the public budget is not sustainable, 
and the level of current deficit destabilizes fiscal 
policy.
Similarly, the tax gap indicator assesses the 
difference between the current tax (/t) rate and the 
permanent tax rate (τ̑ ). The permanent tax rate is
τ̑  = gt – ( nt – rt)*bt  ,    [8]
and the difference is the tax gap, namely
τ t – τ̑  = τ t + ( nt – rt)*bt – gt .   [9]
If (τt  – τ̑ ) difference is less than zero, the current 
tax revenues are not sufficient to secure long-term 
solvency. Regarding the tax gap, to simplify calcu-
lation, overall government revenues are taken into 
account, since in case of sustainability, the origin 
of revenue is a secondary question.
As fiscal union is also a risk pool—which is a 
characteristic that can be considered a common-
pool resource of long-term solvency—, overall 
solvency and willingness to participate are impor-
tant factors to consider. This is why we analyze 
country risk premiums to see whether each one of 
the countries would be a stabilizer or a free rider 
of the fiscal union.
The source of data is Eurostat, AMECO, and, 
indirectly, Datastream: GDP-ratio to general gover-
nment debt, revenues, and expenditures. In case 
of the real interest rate, it was necessary to calcu-
late it as a difference of nominal interest rate and 
inflation. In the mentioned databases, 3-months 
market rates were available historically for every 
current eurozone country, which is why this is the 
base for interest rate calculation. Inflation is the 
annual average change of consumer prices. Current 
primary balance is calculated as a difference of net 
lending/borrowing and the interest payable.
In case of real interest rate calculation, 
it is the difference of nominal interest rate and 
inflation (r = i - HICP). In case of the empirical 
data, there were some dilemmas and constraints 
of statistics. First of all, as gap indicators deal 
with the sustainability of public finances, long-
term government bond yields were taken into 
account as nominal interest rates on borrowing. 
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This is known as Maastricht criterion interest rates.3 
Where the Eurostat database was incomplete, the 
following supplements were made in the database. 
There are no Estonian sovereign debt securities that 
comply with the definition of long-term interest 
rates for convergence purposes. No suitable proxy 
indicator has been identified. 3-months market ra-
tes were taken into account, because Eurostat only 
published historical data regarding this rate in case 
of the eurozone countries. For Cyprus, primary mar-
ket yields are reported. The same applies to Bulgaria 
and Romania up to December 2005, Slovenia up to 
October 2003, and Lithuania up to October 2007. 
A harmonized long-term interest rate is presented 
starting mid-May 2010. Before, the Luxembourg 
Government did not have outstanding long-term 
debt securities with a residual maturity of close 
to ten years. Therefore, the yield on long-term 
bond(s) issued by a private credit institution with 
a residual maturity close to 10 years is presented 
for the period up to mid-May 2010 and is thus not 
fully harmonized for that period. In the following 
cases, the missing data was substituted with 3 
and 12-months yields: Bulgaria 1999-2002, Malta, 
Poland, Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania 1999-2000, 
Romania 1999-2005, Slovenia 1999-2001. There 
were no data for Croatia 1999-2000.
ANALYSIS OF EU FISCAL INDICATORS
The 28 member states of the EU are analyzed from 
the perspective of fiscal sustainability. As fiscal 
union would be built on a monetary integration, 
sustainability indicators are analyzed since the 
implementation of the single currency (1999), 
which was a strong commitment for EU-15 to 
seek fiscal convergence. According to the primary 
balance data (Table 1), calculated from net lending/
borrowing reduced with the interest payable, it 
can be established that the initial commitment to 
fiscal balance in the eve of the euro disappeared 
particularly due to the pro-cyclical policy making of 
3 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/irt_lt_
mcby_esms.htm
some undisciplined governments before the global 
recession (2009), and also because of broadly-used, 
massive, anti-cyclical stimuli during the economic 
crisis, even in many deeply indebted countries, 
alongside with sharply increasing risk premium. 
A serious accumulation of fiscal reserves is only 
observable in the case of Italy among the indeb-
ted eurozone countries. Spain, Greece, Portugal 
and France, or Ireland did not excel in primary 
surplus. In any case, only those countries created 
primary surplus in the EU that earlier reformed their 
own public finances for sustainability: Germany, 
Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, Austria, Luxemburg, 
and the Baltic countries.
However, if we take into account every as-
pects of long-term solvency, the primary gap data 
(Table 2) strengthen the conclusion drawn from the 
primary balance data, with the addition of the UK 
and Czech Republic to the list. The tax gap data 
(Table 3), however, do not confirm the restoration 
of fiscal sustainability after the stimulus period 
in 2011-2014, except in the case of Germany, 
Luxembourg and the UK. Namely, there is a serious 
challenge in the revenue side.
As it was mentioned, fiscal union is a risk 
community. In the case of the EU, the cyclical mo-
vement of the economy in time increases the diffe-
rence of sovereign fiscal risks among the member 
countries (see standard deviation in Table 4 and 
Table 5). That is to say, it is very difficult to create 
fiscal solidarity between disciplined and free rider 
players of the European monetary community. 
CONCLUSIONS
This study analyzed the fiscal sustainability of the 
EU member states, as well as the risk community 
of a potential European fiscal union. The theory of 
fiscal sustainability was summarized and explained 
to a better understanding, and, moreover, sustai-
nability indicators were derived from the terms of 
budget constraint. It was established that govern-
ment solvency is determined by economic growth 
and market rate levels, in addition to internal fis-
cal factors like inherited debt and the balance of 
32
Finanz. polit. econ., ISSN 2248-6046, Vol. 9, No. 1, enero-junio, 2017, pp. 25-39
Gábor Kutasi
revenues and expenditures. The empirical literature 
review presented the results of existing sustaina-
bility analysis regarding the EU. The review stren-
gthened the assumption about the negative impact 
of the crisis and its anticipation of the vulnerability 
and room for maneuver of public finances, as well 
as about fiscal divergence in risk and sustainability 
indicators among the EU members. 
The empirical analysis used the primary gap 
and the tax gap indicators of fiscal sustainability 
and the sovereign risk rating of the eurozone and 
other EU-28 countries. The following conclusions 
were established: 1) the enthusiasm in the majority 
of eurozone countries for debt sustainability lasted 
mostly until their accession to the single currency 
zone. 2) During the economic growth period of 
2000s, many of the EU countries had a pro-cyclical 
fiscal policy according to their primary deficit, 
which deteriorated their sustainability indicators 
too. 3) During the period of 2012-2014, only a few 
EU countries managed to restore debt sustainability 
according to the primary gap indicator. 4) Although 
the single currency zone seemed to be an integra-
ting community with declining and converging 
risk premium in the government bond market, the 
global financial crisis of 2008-2009 highlighted 
that the convergence of risk premia happened 
particularly because of the interim excess liquidity 
of global financial markets and because rating 
agencies misrated the risk of sovereign debtors.
Regarding the fiscal union, in the 2010s, the 
fiscal sustainability structure of the countries shows 
different engagement or capability to create a risk 
pool of fiscal federalism either in the eurozone or in 
the whole EU. The divergence of debt sustainability 
in the eurozone countries and in the EU means a 
potential moral hazard in case of a possible fiscal 
union in a macroeconomic sense. This conclusion 
does not exclude the feasibility of fiscal federalism 
in the EU, but, if it happens, it will be driven by 
political will and intent, which overwrites economic 
rationale.
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APPENDIX: TABLES
Table 1. 
Primary balance
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
AT 0.8 1.6 3.0 2.2 1.4 -1.8 0.7 0.6 1.8 1.6 -2.1 -1.5 0.2 0.5 1.3 -0.2
BE 6.3 6.6 6.7 5.8 3.6 4.6 1.8 4.4 4.1 2.9 -1.6 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 0.4 0.0
BG 3.7 3.6 5.3 1.0 1.8 3.6 2.6 3.1 2.2 2.4 -3.4 -2.5 -1.3 0.2 -0.1 -4.9
HR* -6.4 -3.8 -0.3 -1.8 -2.8 -3.1 -1.8 -1.4 -0.6 -0.8 -3.5 -3.4 -4.8 -1.9 -1.9 -2.1
CY -1.2 0.9 1.0 -1.2 -2.7 -0.7 1.0 2.0 6.0 3.5 -3.1 -2.7 -3.5 -2.9 -1.8 -6.0
CZ -2.5 -2.7 -4.4 -5.2 -5.4 -1.6 -2.0 -1.3 0.4 -1.1 -4.3 -3.1 -1.4 -2.6 0.0 -0.6
DK 5.0 5.6 4.5 3.1 2.7 4.6 7.1 6.8 6.6 4.6 -0.9 -0.8 -0.1 -1.8 0.4 3.0
EE -2.9 0.2 0.4 0.7 2.0 2.6 1.3 3.1 2.9 -2.5 -2.0 0.3 1.3 -0.2 0.0 0.8
FI 4.6 9.6 7.6 6.1 4.2 3.9 4.2 5.4 6.5 5.6 -1.2 -1.3 0.4 -0.7 -1.2 -2.1
FR 1.3 1.5 1.5 -0.2 -1.2 -0.8 -0.6 0.2 0.1 -0.4 -4.8 -4.4 -2.5 -2.2 -1.8 -1.7
DE 1.3 4.0 -0.1 -1.0 -1.3 -0.9 -0.7 1.0 2.9 2.5 -0.6 -1.7 1.5 2.2 1.9 2.1
EL** 4.2 3.5 1.9 0.7 -0.7 -2.5 -0.9 -1.5 -2.2 -5.4 -10.2 -5.3 -2.9 -3.7 -8.4 0.3
HU 1.6 2.3 0.6 -4.9 -3.1 -2.1 -3.7 -5.4 -1.0 0.5 -0.1 -0.4 -1.3 2.3 2.0 1.5
IR 4.8 6.8 2.4 1.0 1.9 2.5 2.3 3.8 1.3 -5.7 -11.8 -29.3 -9.1 -3.9 -1.4 0.1
IT 4.6 4.8 2.7 2.4 1.6 1.0 0.3 0.8 3.3 2.2 -0.9 0.1 1.2 2.2 1.9 1.6
LV -3.1 -1.8 -1.1 -1.5 -0.9 -0.3 0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -3.5 -7.6 -6.8 -1.6 0.8 0.6 -0.1
LT -1.3 -1.5 -2.0 -0.6 -0.1 -0.5 0.5 0.4 -0.1 -2.4 -7.9 -5.1 -7.1 -1.1 -0.8 0.9
LU 4.0 6.1 6.3 2.6 0.8 -0.9 0.4 1.6 4.5 3.6 -0.1 -0.1 1.0 0.7 1.1 1.8
MT -2.9 -1.4 -2.4 -1.5 -5.6 -0.7 1.1 1.1 1.2 -0.9 0.0 -0.1 0.5 -0.6 0.3 0.8
NL 4.2 5.2 2.6 0.5 -0.6 0.6 1.9 2.2 2.2 2.2 -3.4 -3.2 -2.5 -2.3 -0.9 -1.0
PL 0.7 0.0 -1.7 -1.9 -3.1 -2.5 -1.5 -1.2 0.3 -1.5 -4.8 -5.0 -2.4 -1.0 -1.5 -1.4
PT -0.1 -0.2 -1.8 -0.5 -1.7 -3.6 -3.6 -1.5 -0.1 -0.7 -6.8 -8.3 -3.1 -0.8 0.1 -2.3
RO 0.6 -0.8 -0.1 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.0 -1.4 -2.2 -4.9 -7.6 -5.4 -3.8 -1.4 -0.5 0.3
SK -4.0 -8.0 -2.5 -4.6 -0.2 -0.2 -1.2 -2.2 -0.5 -1.1 -6.5 -6.2 -2.6 -2.4 -0.7 -0.9
SI -0.7 -1.2 -1.6 -0.3 -0.7 -0.3 0.2 0.2 1.1 -0.3 -4.6 -4.0 -4.7 -2.1 -12.4 -1.8
ES 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.2 1.9 2.0 2.9 3.8 3.6 -2.9 -9.3 -7.5 -7.0 -7.4 -3.5 -2.5
SE 4.6 6.5 4.0 1.4 0.8 2.0 3.6 3.8 5.0 3.6 0.5 1.1 1.0 0.0 -0.6 -1.0
UK 3.5 3.8 2.6 -0.2 -1.5 -1.7 -1.5 -0.9 -0.8 -2.9 -8.9 -6.8 -4.5 -5.4 -2.8 -3.0
EA19 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.3 2.3 0.7 -3.5 -3.5 -1.2 -0.7 -0.2 0.1
EU28 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.0 1.7 0.2 -4.1 -3.7 -1.6 -1.4 -0.6 -0.5
Mean 1.2 1.9 1.3 0.2 -0.3 0.1 0.5 1.0 1.7 -0.1 -4.2 -4.1 -2.1 -1.3 -1.1 -0.7
S.D. 3.59 3.47 2.90 2.55 2.37 2.31 2.49 2.60 2.93 3.87 4.63 4.49 2.51 2.62 2.56 2.04
Source: Eurostat, HR ‘99-‘00 & EL ‘99-‘05 IMF World Economic Outlook; mean = EU-28 average, S.D. = EU28 standard deviation.
36
Finanz. polit. econ., ISSN 2248-6046, Vol. 9, No. 1, enero-junio, 2017, pp. 25-39
Gábor Kutasi
Table 2. 
Primary gap, if we demand d=0, gap = (nt-rt)*bt
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
AT -39 -11 -92 -103 -134 37 55 87 97 23 -585 30 253 84 32 35
BE -6 77 -208 -167 -190 130 111 90 76 72 -615 153 99 -21 -126 10
BG -698 748 419 284 41 265 253 213 179 163 -127 -46 -6 -34 -32 -95
HR n/a n/a 53 183 172 -44 40 141 110 72 -625 -393 -296 -341 -264 -361
CY -25 230 -115 18 131 45 47 152 142 159 -346 -34 -125 -501 -1226 -946
CZ -55 48 29 -49 -17 76 125 145 117 125 -308 -15 16 -8 -54 35
DK 5 40 -96 -106 -88 -35 26 60 -49 -46 -307 37 54 14 -79 4
EE -33 45 32 33 33 35 50 51 35 -7 -143 24 68 86 46 34
FI 43 128 11 -51 -36 -5 10 62 85 10 -435 80 140 -5 -42 -39
FR -37 18 -66 -112 -73 66 6 32 -19 -57 -510 47 92 -13 -46 -83
DE -114 -51 -69 -201 -238 -67 -50 116 88 -5 -626 206 280 79 25 93
EL -97 99 220 263 464 364 50 560 203 -107 -1115 -1551 -3978 -4703 -2565 -1402
HU -38 155 257 144 97 206 79 44 103 -104 -917 -152 -157 -305 -179 -85
IR 401 363 160 172 110 74 135 125 98 -155 -781 -607 -645 -495 -233 343
IT -157 76 -114 -217 -126 -36 -47 15 -99 -223 -1014 -85 -223 -614 -607 -408
LV -46 32 20 49 89 137 161 142 124 98 -850 -718 192 71 -13 24
LT -161 -46 -1 14 57 62 118 122 196 118 -713 -100 184 86 34 17
LU 32 41 -2 7 4 31 29 34 48 -19 -149 104 65 6 100 82
MT n/a n/a -202 -14 -44 -114 122 5 -1 200 -355 89 8 106 17 115
NL 144 56 109 -43 -80 -35 16 64 43 -18 -367 -41 74 -15 10 -10
PL -114 -149 -156 -145 -69 82 22 107 191 95 24 33 161 16 -108 -6
PT 67 51 61 -29 -104 10 -36 48 33 -116 -678 -202 -938 -1478 -907 -397
RO -473 -41 -55 2 97 58 84 92 59 115 -260 -61 -13 -100 49 -12
SK -258 240 119 45 366 315 192 258 245 138 -335 79 106 34 -16 18
SI 65 56 16 70 56 92 71 113 140 91 -389 -20 -106 -307 -352 11
ES 120 190 91 79 104 100 157 156 81 33 -410 -135 -231 -511 -438 -149
SE 1 32 -42 -65 3 42 11 108 36 -44 -264 184 54 -36 -20 34
UK -26 -29 -37 -40 4 -45 27 27 -7 -73 -353 110 297 194 242 202
EA19 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a -3 -192 -181 -68
EU28 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 43 -130 -108 -18
Source: Author’s calculation based on Eurostat and IMF World Economic Outlook data, and Blanchard’s index (1990).
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Table 3. 
Tax gap, if we demand Tt = gt, gap = (nt-rt)*bt – gt 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
AT -90 -61 -143 -154 -185 -16 4 37 48 -27 -639 -22 202 33 -19 -18
BE -55 29 -257 -216 -240 82 60 42 28 23 -668 101 46 -76 -181 -45
BG -737 708 379 245 3 227 216 179 140 125 -167 -84 -40 -69 -71 -134
HR n/a n/a 8 135 125 -91 -5 95 65 28 -673 -440 -344 -388 -312 -409
CY -59 195 -150 -19 90 6 7 113 104 120 -389 -76 -168 -543 -1268 -995
CZ -96 8 -13 -93 -66 34 83 104 77 85 -352 -58 -27 -52 -96 -7
DK -49 -13 -149 -159 -142 -88 -25 10 -98 -97 -363 -20 -3 -45 -136 -53
EE -74 9 -3 -3 -2 0 16 17 1 -46 -189 -17 30 46 7 -5
FI -8 80 -37 -100 -85 -54 -39 14 39 -38 -490 25 86 -61 -100 -97
FR -89 -33 -118 -164 -125 13 -47 -20 -72 -110 -566 -9 36 -69 -103 -140
DE -161 -95 -116 -248 -286 -114 -96 71 45 -49 -673 159 235 35 -19 49
EL -141 54 176 219 421 321 7 515 156 -158 -1169 -1603 -4032 -4757 -2625 -1452
HU -87 108 210 93 48 157 29 -8 53 -152 -967 -202 -207 -354 -229 -135
IR 367 332 127 138 77 41 102 91 62 -197 -828 -673 -691 -538 -274 304
IT -204 30 -162 -264 -173 -83 -94 -32 -146 -271 -1065 -135 -273 -665 -657 -459
LV -87 -6 -15 14 56 102 126 106 91 61 -894 -762 153 34 -49 -13
LT -201 -82 -36 -20 25 28 84 88 161 80 -758 -143 141 50 -2 -18
LU -8 5 -39 -34 -39 -12 -14 -6 10 -58 -194 60 22 -37 56 38
MT n/a n/a -244 -55 -89 -157 80 -37 -42 157 -397 48 -33 63 -26 71
NL 101 15 66 -87 -125 -79 -26 20 0 -62 -415 -89 27 -63 -37 -57
PL -158 -191 -201 -190 -115 38 -22 62 148 50 -21 -13 117 -27 -150 -48
PT 25 8 17 -72 -150 -36 -83 3 -12 -161 -728 -254 -988 -1527 -957 -446
RO -512 -79 -91 -33 64 25 51 57 21 76 -300 -101 -52 -136 14 -46
SK -305 188 75 1 326 278 153 219 209 101 -379 37 66 -6 -57 -24
SI 20 10 -31 25 10 46 26 69 98 47 -438 -69 -155 -355 -412 -39
ES 80 151 53 40 65 61 119 118 42 -8 -456 -181 -277 -558 -483 -192
SE -55 -22 -95 -119 -51 -11 -42 56 -14 -94 -317 132 3 -89 -73 -19
UK -64 -67 -76 -80 -37 -88 -16 -16 -50 -119 -402 61 250 147 196 158
EA19 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a -52 -242 -230 -117
EU28 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a -6 -179 -156 -66
Source: Author’s calculation based on Eurostat and IMF World Economic Outlook data, and Blanchard’s index (1990).
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Table 4. 
Long-term government bond rates (Maastricht indicator)
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
EA 4.66 5.44 5.00 4.91 4.14 4.12 3.42 3.84 4.32 4.31 3.82 3.60 4.34 3.86 2.99 2.04
BE 4.75 5.59 5.13 4.99 4.18 4.15 3.43 3.81 4.33 4.42 3.90 3.46 4.23 3.00 2.41 1.71
BG : : : : 6.45 5.36 3.87 4.18 4.54 5.38 7.22 6.01 5.36 4.50 3.47 3.35
CZ : : 6.31 4.88 4.12 4.82 3.54 3.80 4.30 4.63 4.84 3.88 3.71 2.78 2.11 1.58
DK 4.91 5.64 5.08 5.06 4.31 4.30 3.40 3.81 4.29 4.28 3.59 2.93 2.73 1.40 1.75 1.32
DE 4.49 5.26 4.80 4.78 4.07 4.04 3.35 3.76 4.22 3.98 3.22 2.74 2.61 1.50 1.57 1.16
IR 4.71 5.51 5.01 5.01 4.13 4.08 3.33 3.76 4.31 4.53 5.23 5.74 9.60 6.17 3.79 2.37
EL 6.30 6.10 5.30 5.12 4.27 4.26 3.59 4.07 4.50 4.80 5.17 9.09 15.75 22.50 10.05 6.93
ES 4.73 5.53 5.12 4.96 4.12 4.10 3.39 3.78 4.31 4.37 3.98 4.25 5.44 5.85 4.56 2.72
FR 4.61 5.39 4.94 4.86 4.13 4.10 3.41 3.80 4.30 4.23 3.65 3.12 3.32 2.54 2.20 1.67
HR : : : : : : : 4.43 4.93 6.04 7.83 6.29 6.54 6.13 4.68 4.05
IT 4.73 5.58 5.19 5.03 4.25 4.26 3.56 4.05 4.49 4.68 4.31 4.04 5.42 5.49 4.32 2.89
CZ : : 7.62 5.70 4.74 5.80 5.16 4.13 4.48 4.60 4.60 4.60 5.79 7.00 6.50 6.00
LV : : 7.57 5.41 4.90 4.86 3.88 4.13 5.28 6.43 12.36 10.34 5.91 4.57 3.34 2.51
LT : : 8.15 6.06 5.32 4.50 3.70 4.08 4.55 5.61 14.00 5.57 5.16 4.83 3.83 2.79
LU 4.66 5.52 4.86 4.70 3.32 2.84 2.41 3.30 4.46 4.61 4.23 3.17 2.92 1.82 1.85 1.34
HU : : 7.95 7.09 6.82 8.19 6.60 7.12 6.74 8.24 9.12 7.28 7.64 7.89 5.92 4.81
MT : : 6.19 5.82 5.04 4.69 4.56 4.32 4.72 4.81 4.54 4.19 4.49 4.13 3.36 2.61
NL 4.63 5.40 4.96 4.89 4.12 4.10 3.37 3.78 4.29 4.23 3.69 2.99 2.99 1.93 1.96 1.45
AT 4.68 5.56 5.08 4.96 4.14 4.13 3.39 3.80 4.30 4.36 3.94 3.23 3.32 2.37 2.01 1.49
PL : : 10.68 7.36 5.78 6.90 5.22 5.23 5.48 6.07 6.12 5.78 5.96 5.00 4.03 3.52
PT 4.78 5.59 5.16 5.01 4.18 4.14 3.44 3.91 4.42 4.52 4.21 5.40 10.24 10.55 6.29 3.75
RO : : : : : : : 7.23 7.13 7.70 9.69 7.34 7.29 6.68 5.41 4.49
SI : : : 8.72 6.40 4.68 3.81 3.85 4.53 4.61 4.38 3.83 4.97 5.81 5.81 3.27
SK : : 8.04 6.94 4.99 5.03 3.52 4.41 4.49 4.72 4.71 3.87 4.45 4.55 3.19 2.07
FI 4.72 5.48 5.04 4.98 4.13 4.11 3.35 3.78 4.29 4.29 3.74 3.01 3.01 1.89 1.86 1.45
SE 4.98 5.37 5.11 5.30 4.64 4.42 3.38 3.70 4.17 3.89 3.25 2.89 2.61 1.59 2.12 1.72
UK 5.01 5.33 5.01 4.91 4.58 4.93 4.46 4.37 5.06 4.50 3.36 3.36 2.87 1.74 2.03 2.14
Mean 4.85 5.52 6.013 5.52 4.61 4.64 3.8 4.22 4.69 4.96 5.454 4.714 5.31 4.931 3.693 2.76
S.D. 0.43 0.19 1.558 1.02 0.8 1.06 0.86 0.9 0.71 1.06 2.762 1.954 2.86 4.117 1.955 1.45
EU28 : : 5.32 5.06 4.35 4.44 3.70 4.08 4.56 4.55 4.11 3.82 4.27 3.65 2.96 2.21
Source: Eurostat; S.D. = standard deviation; mean = unweighted average of EU-28 members.
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Table 5. 
CDS indicators
AT BE BG HR CZ EE FR DE EL HU IR IT LV LT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES
2009, March 207 123 589 495 257 649 77 72 219 547 295 171 1044 767 108 323 116 626 170 164 126
2010, May 71 97 242 234 92 113 71 46 683 238 219 170 357 261 46 139 309 256 84 76 203
2011, July 78 179 229 301 93 93 102 54 2314 294 985 265 213 211 48 163 1045 249 126 116 321
2012, June 181 262 346 530 135 117 200 103 10356 557 663 536 300 282 119 235 1022 437 255 394 586
Change -26 139 -243 35 -122 -532 123 31 10137 10 368 365 -744 -485 11 -88 906 -189 85 230 460
Mean S.D.
2009, March 340.24 269.44
2010, May 190.81 145.54
2011, July 356.14 521.29
2012, June 838.86 2192.36
Source: Heinz & Sun (2014), refer to Datastream; S.D. = standard deviation; mean = average of the countries.
Missing data: CY, DK, SE, MT, LU, FI, UK
Country abbreviations:
EA = current eurozone, EA19 = 19 eurozone members, EU28 = 28 EU members
AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, BG = Bulgaria, HR = Croatia, CY =Cyprus, CZ = Czech Republic, DK = Denmark, EE = Estonia,  
FI = Finland, FR = France, DE = Germany, EL = Greece, HU =Hungary, IR =Ireland, IT = Italy, LV = Latvia, LT = Lithuania,  
LU = Luxemburg, MT = Malta, NL = Netherlands, PL = Poland, PT = Portugal, RO = Romania, SK = Slovakia, SI = Slovenia,  
ES = Spain, SE =Sweden, UK = United Kingdom
